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Abstract—The task of allocating preventative resources to a
computer network in order to protect against the spread of
viruses is addressed. Virus spreading dynamics are described by a
linearized SIS model and protection is framed by an optimization
problem which maximizes the rate at which a virus in the
network is contained given finite resources. One approach to
problems of this type involve greedy heuristics which allocate
all resources to the nodes with large centrality measures. We
address the worst case performance of such greedy algorithms
be constructing networks for which these greedy allocations are
arbitrarily inefficient. An example application is presented in
which such a worst case network might arise naturally and our
results are verified numerically by leveraging recent results which
allow the exact optimal solution to be computed via geometric
programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Given a computer network with links representing pathways
through which computer viruses can propagate, how should
one distribute protection resources to minimize the impact of a
new piece of malware? The network structure and the location
of infected computers play a key role on how quickly the
malware will spread. Conversely, the location of protection
resources within the network can dramatically improve the
efficiency of protection resources aiming to contain malware
spread.
Usual approaches to distribute protection resources in a
network of agents are heuristics based on network centrality
measures [1]. The main idea behind these approaches is to
rank agents according to different measures of importance
based on their location in the network and greedily distribute
protection resources based on the rank. For example, Cohen
et al. [2] proposed a simple vaccination strategy called ac-
quaintance immunization policy in which the most connected
node of a randomly selected node is vaccinated. This strategy
was proved to be much more efficient than random vaccine
allocation. Hayashi et al. [3] proposed a simple heuristic
called targeted immunization consisting on greedily choosing
nodes with the highest degree (number of connections) in
scale-free graphs. Chung et at. [4] studied a greedy heuristic
immunization strategy based on the PageRank vector of the
contact graph. Tong et al. [5] and Giakkoupis et al. [6]
proposed greedy heuristics based on immunizing those agents
that induce the highest drop in the dominant eigenvalue
of the contact graph. Recently, Prakash et al. [7] proposed
several greedy heuristics to contain spreading processes in
directed networks when nodes can be partially immunized
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(instead of completely removed, as assumed in previous work).
These heuristics, as those in [3], [5], are based on eigenvalue
perturbation analysis.
Recently, an optimization-based approach have been de-
veloped in [8]- [9] to solve exactly–without relaxations or
heuristics–the optimal immunization problem in polynomial
time. In particular, in [8], [10], the authors proposed a
convex formulation to find the optimal allocation of protec-
tive resources in an undirected network using semidefinite
programming (SDP). In [11], the authors solve the optimal
immunization problem in weighted and directed networks
of nonidentical agents using Geometric Programming (GP).
Also, in [9] a linear-fractional (LF) optimization program
was proposed to compute the optimal investment on disease
awareness over the nodes of a social network to contain a
spreading process.
Based on the exact solution to the immunization problem
developed in [11], we propose worst-case scenarios in which
the heuristics previously proposed in the literature perform
very poorly. In our analysis, we derive the exact optimal
solution for certain directed networks and compare with those
solutions obtained using previous heuristics. Our results show
how previous heuristics can perform arbitrarily poorly in
certain directed graphs.
II. THE NETWORK PROTECTION PROBLEM
The susceptible-infected-susceptible model (SIS) is a pop-
ular stochastic epidemic model first introduced by Weiss and
Dishon, [12]. A discrete time variation of this model for
networked populations is explored by Wang et al. in [13]. A
continuous time version called the N-intertwined SIS model
was proposed and extensively analyzed by Van Meighem et al.
in [14]. An extension of the N-intertwined SIS (NiSIS) model
including heterogenous agents (HeNiSIS) is presented in Pre-
ciado et al., [11] and an exact solution to a family of network
protection problems is also presented. The network protection
problem addressed in this work is allocation of preventative
resources given a fixed budget with the goal of maximizing
the rate at which the epidemic is expunged. The exact solution
presented in [11] are leveraged to characterize the worst case
behavior of common simple heuristics which greedily allocate
resources within a network based on centrality measures.
A. Preliminaries
Before proceeding with the model we introduce some
notation. A weighted directed graph (digraph) is defined as
G = (V,E,W ) where V is the set of n nodes, E ⊆ V × V
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2is a set of ordered pairs of nodes indicating directed edges
and edge weights W ∈ Rn×n+ defined as weighted incidence
matrix, Wij = 0 for all (i, j) 6∈ E. The neighbor set of
node i is defined Ni = {j : (i, j) ∈ E}. For an n × n
matrix M , the eigenvalues λi(M) are ordered such that
R(λ1) ≥ R(λ2) ≥ · · · ≥ R(λn) where R(y) denotes the
real part of y ∈ C.
B. Virus spreading model
The HeNiSIS model is a continuous time networked Markov
process where each node in the network can be in one
of two states: infected or susceptible. The state is defined
Xi(t) = {0, 1} for agent i at time t with Xi(t) = 1 indicates
the infected state. Two types of state transitions occur in this
model. The probability of these transitions are defined over an
infinitesimal time interval [t, t+ ∆t).
1) A node in the susceptible state may become infected
with a probability determined by that nodes infection
rate βi state of its neighbors {Xj(t),∀j ∈ Ni} and the
strength of the connections, {wji,∀j ∈ Ni}:
Pr(Xi(t+ ∆t) = 1|Xi(t) = 0) = (1)∑
j∈Ni
WjiβiXj(t)∆t+ o(∆t)
2) A node in the infected state may recover from the
infection based on the recovery parameter δ:
Pr(Xi(t+ ∆t) = 0|Xi(t) = 1) = δ∆t+ o(∆t) (2)
Analysis under this model is done using the mean field approx-
imation. The state variable becomes pi(t), the probability that
node i is infected at time t. This quantity evolves according
to the n ordinary differential equations:
dp(t)
dt
= (BW − δI)p(t)− P (t)BWp(t) (3)
where p(t) is the stacked vector of probabilities pi(t),
P (t) =diag(p(t)) and B is the diagonal matrix with Bii = βi.
This system has stable disease free equilibrium p∗ = 0.
From Proposition 1 in [11], the system stability is globally
exponentially stable (with rate ) if R(λ1(BW − δI)) ≤ −
for some  > 0. Introducing a budget C and a cost function
over the protection resources f : [β, β¯] → R, the network
protection problem maximizes the rate at which the virus is
killed off. Cost is incurred when decreasing the infection rate
so it is assumed that f(β) is monotonically non-increasing.
Problem 1 The Network Protection Problem is given by
max
β,

s.t. R[λ1(BW − δI)] ≤ −
n∑
i=1
f(βi) ≤ C
β ≤ βi ≤ β¯ ∀i ∈ V.
This problem can be solved exactly via convex optimiza-
tion when the function f(·) is a log-convex function, [11].
Knowledge of the optimal solution of problem 1 is a new
development. This work proceeds to evaluate common simple
heuristics in light of this knowledge.
C. Greedy, Centrality Based Strategies
Before addressing types of greedy heuristics, we define
some additional notation.
Definition 1 In the vaccination problem, for any vector u ∈
Rn over the nodes and subset of the node set S ⊆ V , define
the vector
u(S) ∈ R|S|
to be the values of u on the nodes in S.
Definition 2 Extract the effective objective in Problem 1
which is induced by the epigraph form. Define
(β) = −R[λ1(BW − δI)] (4)
where B = diag(β) for any feasible resource allocation β.
Monotonicity and continuity of the function (β) guarantee
that fixing any feasible β and maximizing over  always causes
the constraint R[λ1(BW − δI)] ≤ − to become tight. At the
optimal point (β∗, ∗) of Problem 1 satisfies
∗ = −R[λ1(diag(β∗)W − δI)].
Thus, when solving the resource allocation β, (β) is treated
as the effective objective in Problem 1.
Definition 3 Define the efficiency of a feasible resource allo-
cation β as
Q(β) =
(β)− (β¯)
(β∗)− (β¯) ∈ [0, 1] (5)
where β∗ is a resource allocation achieving the maximum in
Problem 1.
The effective objective (β) and the costs functions f(βi) are
monotonically non-increasing in the resource allocations βi at
each node, therefore β¯ trivially achieves the minimum over
the set of feasible resource allocations β.
Definition 4 Let v be a centrality vector. Given a budget
sufficient to completely vaccinate k nodes: C = kf(β), the
greedy vaccination strategy βˆv is to completely vaccinate in
k nodes with the highest values in v. Define the vaccination
fraction: r = k/N where N is the the total number of nodes.
Common centrality measures used for heuristics are degree
and eigenvector centrality, [3]. Page rank centrality is used
as in place of eigenvector centrality in the case of general
digraphs, [4]. While Page rank depends on a parameter α, we
drop the α from our notation because our results hold for the
whole family of Page rank vectors generated by non-trivial
choices of α ∈ (0, 1).
3III. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
Theorem 2 Given a budget C, there exists a network G
satisfying
Q(βˆDEG) = Q(βˆPR) = 0
where r ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of nodes that can be
vaccinated.
Proof: Construct the network G = {V,E} as follows,
the node set is partitioned V = Cm ∪ Sn where |Sn| = n,
|Cm| = m and N = m+ n. Choose any n and m satisfying
2 < m ≤ n
(
1
r
− 1
)
and C ≤ nf(β). (6)
As shown in Fig. 1, define the subgraph Cm as an m node
directed cycle, Sn as an n node empty network and the there
are edges from all nodes i ∈ Sn to all nodes j ∈ Cm. Formally,
the edge set is given by
(i, j) ∈ E if any of
 i ∈ Sn, j ∈ Cmi, j = i+ 1 ∈ Cm
i = m+ n, j = n+ 1 ∈ Cm
(7)
and in all other cases (i, j) 6∈ E. Let us consider the object
function in the case of G, (β) =
− Rλ1
(
δI −
[
diagβ(Sn) 0
0 diagβ(Cm)
] [
0 11′
0 U
])
(8)
where U is the adjacency matrix of the directed cycle. Block
multiplication yields (β) =
− Rλ1
(
δI −
[
0 diagβ(Cm)(11′)
0 diagβ(Cm)U
])
(9)
which due to the block diagonal structure simplifies to
(β) = Rλ1 (diagβ(Cm)U)− δ (10)
which tells us that the optimal budget allocation is over the
nodes in Cm,
β∗ = [β¯(Sn), β∗(Cm)]. (11)
Sn
Cm
n-node empty network
all edges from Sn to Cm
are present
m-node directed cycle
Fig. 1. We construct the network G to prove theorem 2.
Consider the out-degree1 vector of G:
DEG(i) =
{
1, ∀i ∈ Cm
m, ∀i ∈ Sn (12)
By our choice of m and n, rN < n and the greedy heuristic
solution βˆDEG, satisfies
i ∈ Cm =⇒ βˆDEG(i) = β¯i. (13)
From (11) infection rates for nodes in Sn have no impact
on , thus (βˆDEG) = (β¯) < (β∗). For the case of βˆPR,
it is necessary to compute the Page rank vector for G. The
Page rank vector is the dominant eigenvector of the stochastic
matrix
α
N
11′ + (1− α)W¯ (14)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the teleportation parameter and W¯ is a
random walk matrix on G given by
W¯ij =
{
1
1+DEGi
, (i, i) and (i, j) ∈ E
0, otherwise
. (15)
Due to the structure (symmetry within Sn and Cm) of G and
the fact that the dominant eigenvalue of a stochastic matrix is
1, we can write the block matrix eigenvector equation
Pα
[
χ1
1
]
=
[
χ1
1
]
(16)
where
Pα =
[
α
N 11
′ + (1− α)I αN 11′ + (1−α)m+2 11′
α
N 11
′ α
N 11
′ + (1−α)m+2 (U + I)
]
(17)
where U is the adjacency matrix for Cm, which satisfies
U ′1 = 1 . Simplifying equation defined by (17) and (16)
by multiplying through by each instance of 1, we have
α
N
(χn+m) + (1− α)χ+ (1− α) m
m+ 2
= χ (18)
α
N
(χn+m) + (1− α) 2
m+ 2
= 1. (19)
Subtracting (19) from (18) and simplifying, we have
χ =
1
α
(
1 +
(1− α)(m− 2)
m+ 2
)
. (20)
We have selected m > 2, so it is guaranteed that χ > 1 for all
α ∈ (0, 1). From equation (16) we have the probability vector
PR(i) =
{ 1
nχ+m ∀i ∈ Cm
χ
nχ+m ∀i ∈ Sn
(21)
with χ > 1, guaranteeing that nodes i ∈ Sn always have
greater Page rank centrality than nodes in Cm. Using the same
argument as in the degree centrality case, we have (βˆPR) =
(β¯) < (β∗).
Remark 3 The proof of Theorem 2 makes use of a construc-
tive example for the centrality measures which identify nodes
which are the most likely to become infected: (a) out degree
and (b) Page rank with a random walk defined as moving up
1Total degree centrality may be substituted for out degree by imposing
the condition m > n + 2. Such an (n,m) pair exists and is chosen for
demonstrations in section IV.
4the edges. If one uses centrality measures which identify nodes
which would be the most potent seeds such as (c) in degree
or (d) Page rank computed using a random walk that flows
down the edges, one can construct an alternative G by simply
reversing the direction of the edges from Sn to Cm. Using this
alternative network, one can reproduce Theorem 2 for (c) and
(d).
Theorem 2 tells us that for a general digraph, the greedy
allocation strategy can be arbitrarily bad. However, common
network resource allocations take the basic assumption that
the graph is strongly connected. Since the proof constructs a
graph which is weakly, but not strongly connected we develop
a related theorem for strongly connected digraphs.
Lemma 1 There is a 1 parameter family of strongly connected
digraph G′γ = {V,E ∪ Eγ} for γ > 0 with the node set
V = Sn∪Cm, for which the greedy centrality based strategies
βˆDEG and βˆPR allocate resources only in Sn.
Proof: Consider the N node network G = {V,E}
presented in the proof of theorem 2. We construct a new
network G′γ = {V,E ∪ Eγ} where Eγ is all to all and these
edges are assigned positive weight γ > 0.
With the addition of the all to all edge set, it is trivial to
observe that the out degree centrality vector becomes
DEG(i) =
{
1 + γN ∀i ∈ Cm
m+ γN ∀i ∈ Sn (22)
By our choice of m and n, rN < n and the greedy heuristic
solution βˆDEG, satisfies
i ∈ Cm =⇒ βˆDEG(i) = β¯i. (23)
therefore the resource allocation is entirely on Sn.
Now we consider the case of Page rank centrality according
to the definition in equation (14) for the random walk W¯ on
G′γ computed according to (15). The fixed point equation is
given by (16) where
Pα =
α
N
11′ + (1− α)
[
I+γ11′
1+Nγ
(1+γ)11′
m+2+Nγ
γ11′
1+Nγ
(I+U+γ11′)
m+2+Nγ
]
(24)
Simplifying equation (16) with Pα defined by (24) by multi-
plying through by each instance of the vector 1 and consoli-
dating terms, we have
αnχ+(1−α)m
N +
(1−α)(1+γn)χ
1+Nγ +
(1−α)(1+γm)
m+2+Nγ
= χ (25)
αnχ+(1−α)m
N +
(1−α)(2+mγ)
m+2+Nγ
= 1. (26)
Subtracting (26) from (25) many terms cancel and allowing
us to simplify and solve for χ:
χ =
1 +Nγ
α+Nγ
(
1 +
(1− α)(m− 2)
m+ 2 +Nγ
)
. (27)
The leading term in the product 1+Nγα+Nγ > 1 and we have
selected m > 2, so χ > 1 is guaranteed for all γ > 0. From
(21), the Page rank of any node in Sn is a factor of χ > 1 times
that of any node in Cm, guaranteeing that nodes i ∈ Sn always
have greater Page rank centrality than nodes in Cm. Following
the same argument as for the DEG based allocation, the PR
greedy resource allocation is entirely on the set Sn.
Lemma 1 characterizes the greedy resource allocation strate-
gies on the family of digraphs G′γ . Specifically, the infection
rate profiles achieved βˆDEG and βˆPR do not depend on γ.
For any γ nodes in Sn are fully immunized until all resources
are expended.
Theorem 4 There exists a strongly connected digraph for
which the centrality based greedy solutions βˆv are arbitrarily
inefficient solutions to Problem 1, in the sense that
Q(βˆv) =
(βˆv)− (β¯)
(β∗)− (β¯) ≤ Γ
for any Γ > 0, when the centrality vector v = DEG, or PR.
Proof: Define a γ-parameterized version of the effective
objective in (4) as
(β; γ) = −R[λ1(diag(β)(W + γ11′)− δI)] (28)
where W is the adjacency matrix of G so we have explicitly
written the effective objective of a infection rate profile β on
the network G′γ as defined in Lemma 1. For any fixed β the
function β(γ) = (β; γ) is a scalar mapping β : R+ → R.
The eigenvalues of a matrix are continuous functions in the
matrix elements because they are the roots of the characteristic
equation, [15]. Thus the mapping β(γ) is continuous in γ
because it is a composition of continuous functions.
Define a γ-parameterized efficiency function using the γ-
parameterized effective objective
Q(β; γ) =
β(γ)− β¯(γ)
(β∗; γ)− β¯(γ)
∈ [0, 1]. (29)
Observe that the optimal resource allocation β∗ depends on
γ and satisfies (β∗) > (β¯) for all networks guaranteeing
that (β∗; γ) > (β¯; γ) = β¯(γ) for all γ ∈ R+. Having
established that the denominator in the quotient is strictly
positive, conclude that the function Q(β; γ) is continuous in
γ because it can be constructed as sums and products of
continuous functions.
From Theorem 2, the efficiency of βˆ selected according
degree or Page rank yields zero efficiency on network G which
can be rewritten in terms of the γ-parametrized efficiency as
Q(βˆDEG; γ = 0) = Q(βˆPR; γ = 0) = 0. (30)
Leveraging the continuity of Q(β; γ), there exists a γ such
that Q(βˆDEG; γ), Q(βˆPR; γ) ≤ Γ for any Γ > 0.
Theorem 4 shows that having a strongly connected digraph
does not remove the possibility that greedy centrality based
networks will perform very poorly. The digraph family con-
structed in the proof is only one method to produce a worst-
case digraph. Other worst case digraphs may be constructed
but few are so easily analyzed.
5Network A (Cm = Undirected Network) Network G (Cm= Directed Cycle)
strategy 
profile β
convergence 
rate ε
Efficiency
Legend
No Allocation Out Degree 
Allocation
Total Degree 
Allocation
Page Rank 
Allocation
Sym Page Rank 
Allocation
Optimal 
Allocation
No Allocation Out Degree 
Allocation
Total Degree 
Allocation
Page Rank 
Allocation
Sym Page Rank 
Allocation
Optimal 
Allocation
node 1 (Sn) 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.5
node 2 (Sn) 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.5
node 3 (Sn) 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.5
node 4 (Cm) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0261 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0196
node 5 (Cm) 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.0174 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0196
node 6 (Cm) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0261 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0196
node 7 (Cm) 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.0174 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0196
node 8 (Cm) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0261 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0196
node 9 (Cm) 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.0131 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0196
- -1.11 -1.11 0.152 -1.11 0.152 0.248 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.28
- 0 0 0.929 0 0.929 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
unstable rate stable rate optimal allocation
Network A (Cm = Undirected Network) Network G (Cm= Directed Cycle)
Centrality 
Measures
Legend
Out Degree 
Centrality
Total Degree 
Centrality
Page Rank 
Centrality
Sym Page Rank 
Centrality
Out Degree 
Centrality
Total Degree 
Centrality
Page Rank 
Centrality
Sym Page 
Rank Centrality
node 1 (Sn) 6 6 0.289 0.093 6 6 0.299 0.122
node 2 (Sn) 6 6 0.289 0.093 6 6 0.299 0.122
node 3 (Sn) 6 6 0.289 0.093 6 6 0.299 0.122
node 4 (Cm) 2 7 0.020 0.105 1 5 0.017 0.106
node 5 (Cm) 3 9 0.023 0.128 1 5 0.017 0.106
node 6 (Cm) 2 7 0.020 0.104 1 5 0.017 0.106
node 7 (Cm) 3 9 0.023 0.128 1 5 0.017 0.106
node 8 (Cm) 2 7 0.020 0.104 1 5 0.017 0.106
node 9 (Cm) 4 11 0.026 0.151 1 5 0.017 0.106
Nodes selected for protection
Fig. 4. (Top) A variety of centrality measures are used as the basis for greedy algorithms, these measures are reported for the Networks A and G. (Bottom)
The allocation strategies tested are detailed, their exponential convergence rate bounds  and their efficiencies are reported for comparison purposes. For the
case of the counter example network G, none of the greedy type algorithms yield a stable convergence rate.
Network A
1 2 3
4
6 5
78
9
Network G
1 2 3
6
4 5
78
9
Fig. 2. Network G with vertices S3 = {1, 2, 3} and C6 = {4, 5, . . . , 9}
satisfies the conditions for the counter example network defined in Theorem
2. In Network A the subgraph on C6 is relaxed to be less structured for
demonstration purposes.
IV. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
We consider a simple application in which such a worst case
network might arise naturally. Nodes are computers belonging
to individuals in a work environment. Edges indicate access
to files on another persons computer. Cm consists of a group
of workers and Sn a group of administrators who can access
files on all works computers. Workers have limited access to
each others computers but do not have access to files on the
administrator’s computers. We assume the virus may spread
when an uninfected computer accesses an infected computer.
Protection resources take the form of antivirus software with
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No Resources
PR/DEG Greedy
Sym− PR/DEG Greedy
Optimal Allocation
Fig. 3. The HeNiSIS dynamics are considered on the networks A and G
when one node initially has an infection with probability 1. (Top, Left) In the
counter example network G, all greedy algorithms fail to prevent the outbreak
while the optimal allocation protects the network. (Bottom, left) The rate at
which the virus is expunged by the optimal solution is exponential. (Top,
Right) In network A, the symmetric centralities measures and the optimal
allocation eventually eliminate the virus. (Bottom, Right) The rate at which
the optimal allocation eliminates the virus is faster.
6updates on a variable time interval, software updated more
frequently providing a smaller infection rate β but updates
incurring a greater cost f(β). The cost function
f(βi) =
β( β¯βi − 1)
β¯ − β (31)
is chosen to satisfy f(β¯) = 0, f(β) = 1 and f(β) ∝ 1/β. This
allows us to choose capacity C equal to the number of nodes
we wish to be able to allocate maximum protection. In our
example the infection rate with outdated anti-virus software is
β¯ = .5 while the maximum update rate achieves an infection
rate of β = .01. Choosing a budget of C = 3 for a network
with n = 3 and m = 6 (such as in G or A shown in Fig.
2), the fraction of nodes that can be maximally protected is
r = 1/3. An infected machine has recovery rate δ = 0.3,
based on curative resources which are uniformly available.
In the example, four heuristic algorithms based on greedily
allocating resources with respect to centrality measures are
considered. The centrality measures are out degree, total
degree, Page rank with α = .1 and symmetrized Page rank
with α = .1. Symmetrized Page rank is computed by allowing
the random walk move over a directed edge in either direction.
The worst case networks are products of extreme asymmetry
between Cm and Sn, the symmetric centrality measure show
that even symmetric centrality measure don’t overcome the
potential for arbitrarily poor behavior.
In Fig. 4 the top table shows all of the centrality vectors
for the example problem in the networks A and G. The
network G is the network constructed in our analytical proofs.
The network A is an example of a less structured employee
collaboration network which we include to demonstrate two
points: (i) our constructed network G is not unique and (ii)
symmetrizing heuristics are less fragile than heuristics that
respect edge direction.
In G and A the out degree and Page rank heuristics allocate
all resources to the admins, Sn. This is ineffective because
even though the admins are the most likely to become infected
the worker group, Cm cannot access their files and become
infected. Fig. 4 (bottom) shows the infection rate profiles
generated by the various heuristics and the optimal solution.
A strategy is ineffective if the convergence rate epsilon is
negative because this corresponds to unstable dynamics and
the probability of infection becoming one for all machines.
Figure 3 demonstrates the dynamic under each of the strategy
profiles stated in Figure 4.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proven that for common centrality measures there
exist networks for which greedy allocation of protection
resources is completely ineffective. Furthermore, these worst
case networks are not completely unreasonable pathological
cases. An application in which this network structure could
arise naturally is presented.
In practice, if the information and computational power
to solve the optimization via GP are available, this method
should always be used. Restrictions on computational power
or complete information may still lead to use of heuristics.
Degree can be computed locally and Page rank can be approx-
imated iteratively. When using these heuristics, we suggest
using symmetric variants; while we showed that even the
symmetric heuristics can be arbitrarily inefficient, we found
the symmetric variants to be more robust.
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